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“The health of the people is really the foundation upon
which all their happiness and all their power as a state
depend.”
—Former Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli1
ABSTRACT
An economic crisis, sky-rocketing healthcare costs, and mil-
lions of Americans without health insurance combine to bring
to the public square not only the possibility of a meaningful
debate but the political perfect storm that might unearth en-
trenched partisans and bring about meaningful healthcare
reform.  The current taxation of expenditures for healthcare
is a complex, unjust, uneconomical, and inefficient system.
This article seeks to refute revisionist historians who might
argue that healthcare in the workplace had no meaningful
presence until World War II and to highlight the reasons for
the development of employer-provided healthcare; to explain
the fundamental inequities wrought by the current tax subsi-
dies granted health benefits; to suggest reasons for reform;
and to provide a framework for evaluating reform proposals.
INTRODUCTION
Any meaningful discussion about healthcare reform in the
United States must include tax reform.  The tax treatment of
expenditures for healthcare reflects a deliberate social choice
* Eleanor Weston Brown, Associate Professor of Law, Regent University
School of Law, L.L.M. in Taxation, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Wil-
liam & Mary; J.D., T.C.  Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.  My
thanks to Amber B. Zebley, J.D. Candidate, 2010, Regent University School of Law,
for her research and editing assistance on this article.
1. Disraeli, Benjamin, British Prime Minister and First Earl of Beaconsfield,
Some Results of Sanitary Reform, Address Given at the Opening of New Blocks of
Improved Tenements (June 24, 1877), reprinted in Some Results of Sanitary Reform,
in THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING PEOPLE 71 (E.R. L. Gould ed., 1895).
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to incent certain risk-sharing arrangements.  The instant
question is whether subsidies remain critical for achieving
the goal of social security, and if so, whether the current
structure fairly achieves that goal.  Whether the federal tax
laws should provide incentives to advance healthcare goals of
society is beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, this au-
thor seeks to highlight why the tax system was employed,
why it is not working effectively now to promote social secur-
ity and, relying on lessons from those past experiences, to
suggest here a framework against which proposals can be
evaluated to meet social policy goals.
In Part I, a history of the development of healthcare bene-
fits is reviewed.  That review reveals a long-standing
American effort, both private and public, to pool the risks as-
sociated with sickness and the genesis of tax subsidies to
incent those efforts.  Part II sets forth the current tax subsi-
dies for health benefits and provides a concrete example to
highlight the inequities of the current landscape.  Part III
outlines reasons for reform.  Beginning with the concept of
tax expenditure, Part III illuminates the size of the enormous
subsidies supporting healthcare and seeks to explain that
such subsidies represent economic spending.  Next, funda-
mental questions of fairness are addressed, illuminating the
inequities in the current system.  Finally, the economic im-
pacts of current tax policy on healthcare are evaluated.  That
analysis reveals inherent inefficiencies.  In Part IV, a frame-
work for evaluating reform proposals is offered, drawing on
lessons from historical as well as current social and economic
experience.
I. HISTORY
Associating health benefits with the workplace is not a
modern American phenomenon.  The first government initia-
tive to provide health insurance for workers began in 1798
when federal customs officials collected a per sailor tax to
fund medical care for sick merchant sailors when away from
home.2  During the same time period, skilled craftsmen
2. JOHN E. MURRAY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE, A HISTORY OF
INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS FUNDS 74 (2007).  The revenue from the taxes financed the
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united to form “Mutual Assistance Societies” to provide vari-
ous forms of aid to sick members.3  Over the next one
hundred years, workers continued to unite to insure against
the risk of economic loss because of sickness by pooling to-
gether.4  Labor unions created “Sickness Insurance Funds” to
provide stable financial assistance as well as medical assis-
tance to sick members.5  Companies also created “Sickness
Funds.”6  Because participation in these funds was voluntary,
workers anticipating a future need to draw the benefits
would tend to participate; younger workers and those not an-
ticipating a need might opt not to participate.7  That adverse
selection undermined the viability of such voluntary funds
since the risk of payment was high given the propensity of
those needing coverage to participate.8  Nevertheless, by the
late 19th century, sickness insurance provided through the
labor unions or by individual employers provided stable and
efficient risk-sharing for many workers at the time.9
In the early 20th century, Progressives arguing for a Euro-
pean-style government-run health insurance argued that
Sickness Funds were miserly and restricted benefits.10  A
campaign to replace sickness insurance with health insur-
ance was waged in the American political arena.11
Progressives argued that government provided the only via-
ble option for risk-sharing, pointing to the adverse selection
experience of the Sickness Funds.12  Co-opting the European
experience, the Progressives began using the term “health in-
surance” as a more positive marker for the relationship that
construction of the first marine hospital in Norfolk, Virginia in 1800. Id.  Where a
port had no marine hospital to care for sick merchant sailors, the Marine Hospital
Service, later to become the Public Health Service, arranged for care. Id.
3. Id. at 73.
4. Id. at 74.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6.
10. See generally SAMUEL JOHN DUNCAN-CLARK, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT:
ITS PRINCIPLES AND ITS PROGRAMME (1913) for a contemporaneous perspective on the
Progressive Era in America, dating from the late 1800s to the 1920s, that arose to
address many of the social ills caused by industrialization.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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had been known as sickness insurance.13  Those Progressive
Reform efforts failed.14  During the 1920s and 1930s, chang-
ing demographics, advances in medical science and shifts
from acute care to chronic care models operated to increase
the demand for medical care at hospitals instead of at
home.15  The demand for a method to finance healthcare grew
as the demand for health services grew.16  To protect reve-
nues, hospitals began to develop “hospital service plans.”17
These hospital service plans provided hospital care to partici-
pants in the plan, usually school systems18 and large firms, in
exchange for a small premium.19  Prompted by the increasing
demand, the American Hospital Association (AHA) created a
commission to set standards and to encourage legislation
which permitted the plans to organize and operate as not-for-
profit, tax-exempt entities.20  The AHA coordinated a net-
work of plans which became the Blue Cross network.21
New Deal policies promoted by President Franklin
Roosevelt resulted in the passage of several forms of social
insurance.22  Roosevelt’s rhetoric addressed health benefits
but no legislation resulted.23  In a speech to the Conference
13. Id.
14. Despite the failure to secure government-run health insurance, the
Progressive Movement experienced many successes.  Significantly, the 16th
Amendment, ratified in 1913, permitted Congress to levy an income tax without
apportioning it among the states and paved the way for the modern income tax,
codified in 1926. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
15. Melissa Thomassen, Health Insurance in the United States, EH.NET
ENCYCLOPEDIA, Apr. 17, 2003, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/thomasson.
insurance.health.us.
16. ROBERT B. HELMS, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH, TAX POLICY
AND THE HISTORY OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3–4 (Feb. 29, 2008), http://
www.aei.org/docLib/healthconference-helms.pdf.
17. Id.
18. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK:  A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 56 (2007).  The first known hospital service plan was
formed by a group of employees at Baylor University who contracted with their local
hospital to provide care in exchange for a monthly premium. Id.
19. See HELMS, supra note 16, at 3. R
20. LEIYU SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, ESSENTIALS OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 63 (2d ed. 2010).
21. Id.
22. Most notably the Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat.
620 (1935).
23. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Advisory Council of the
Committee on Economic Security on the Problems of Economic and Social Security
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on Economic Security, Roosevelt seemed ambiguous in his
references to health insurance:
There is also the problem of economic loss due to sick-
ness—a very serious matter for many families with and
without incomes, and therefore, an unfair burden upon
the medical profession.  Whether we come to this form of
insurance soon or later on, I am confident that we can
devise a system which will enhance and not hinder the
remarkable progress which has been made and is being
made in the practice of the professions of medicine and
surgery in the United States.24
During World War II, a different motivation fostered in-
creased health insurance from employment.  To stabilize the
work force and ensure certain production levels, wage and
price controls were instituted.25  The National War Labor
Board (NWLB) administered those regulations with respect
to wages.26  In an effort to circumvent those controls and at-
tract scarce workers, employers began offering generous
benefits including health insurance.27  The NWLB excluded
certain employee fringe benefits, including health insurance,
from the definition of wages.28  That ruling was consistent
with the income tax treatment.  The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ruled in 1943 that payments made directly to a
commercial insurance company for group medical and hospi-
talization insurance were not income.29  Because the Ruling
applied to a narrow set of facts, uncertainties in the tax con-
sequences of employer-provided benefits stalled expansion in
the marketplace.  President Eisenhower advocated for the ex-
clusion:  “Insurance and other plans adopted by employers to
protect their employees against the risks of sickness should
be encouraged by removing the present uncertainties in the
(Nov. 14, 1934) in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
452, 454 (1938).
24. Id. at 452.
25. See Stabilization Act of 1942, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (1942).
26. HELMS, supra note 16, at 6–7. R
27. Id. at 7.
28. See generally 4 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WAR LABOR REPORTS,
REPORTS AND DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD LXIV (1943).
29. See Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the
1954 Code, 64 YALE L. J. 222, 241 (1954–1955) (citing Special Ruling, 3 CCH 1943
FED. TAX REP. ¶ 6587 (1943) (ruling that payments for group medical and
hospitalization insurance were not taxable income)).
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tax law.”30  With the promulgation of the 1954 Internal Reve-
nue Code, the exclusion of employer-provided healthcare
benefits from taxation became clear.31
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
The current tax treatment of expenditures for healthcare is
complex, unjust, uneconomical, and inefficient.  Those who
receive healthcare benefits through their employment, either
as an employee or as self-employed, are taxed differently
than those who do not receive those benefits at work.  That
disparate treatment begs fundamental questions of fair-
ness.32  An explanation of the current statutory scheme will
highlight the disparity—but first a review of fundamental tax
principles.
A. General Principles
Our system of federal taxation is primarily one of income
taxation.33  Income is broadly defined.  In Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass,34 an early case interpreting the statutory
meaning of income,35 the United States Supreme Court re-
ferred to the “sweeping scope”36 of the statute and
determined that “Congress applied no limitations as to the
source of taxable receipts.”37  The Court held that “accessions
to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion”38 are taxable income unless specifi-
cally excluded noting:  “[T]he Court has given a liberal
construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the
intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically
30. Budget Message of the President – Part I, 100 CONG. REC. 3, 570 (1954).
31. See I.R.C. §§ 104–105 (1954).  For a general discussion of the political
climate and development of the health insurance provisions of the 1954 Code, see
Taxation of Employer Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code,
supra note 29. R
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See 26 U.S.C. Subtitle A. Income Taxes (2009).
34. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
35. See I.R.C. § 22 (1939).
36. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 431.
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exempted.”39  The Internal Revenue Code defines “gross in-
come” as “all income from whatever source derived, including
. . . [c]ompensation for services, including fees, commissions,
FRINGE BENEFITS, and similar items.”40  That statutory con-
struct and its interpretation by the United States Supreme
Court are consistent with the internal norms of the income
tax system which intends to tax net increases in wealth.41
Health benefits paid by an employer to or for the benefit of an
employee as a consequence of his employment form a part of
the compensation paid to that employee.42  Consistent with
internal norms defining income, Glenshaw Glass and section
61(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, such health benefits
should be treated as income.43  Certainly from a clear eco-
nomic perspective, the employee is wealthier when his
employer pays a personal expense on his behalf.  Yet, Con-
gress deems to exclude certain health benefits from income.44
Furthermore, Congress provides a deduction in certain cases
for medical expenses borne by a taxpayer.45  Such a deduction
is inconsistent with internal norms which would permit a de-
duction only for expenses related to the production of income
and would deny a deduction for personal expenses.46
39. Id. at 430.
40. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1986) (emphasis added); unless indicated otherwise, all
references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the 1986 Code, as amended.
[hereinafter I.R.C. or the Code].
41. During the development of the income tax system, German legal scholar
Georg von Schanz and American economists Robert M. Haig and Henry C. Simons
independently theorized a system of the taxation of income defining income as net
increases in wealth plus personal consumption. JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAX:  DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 37–39 (2004).  The proposed
formula taxes increases in wealth, subtracts expenditures necessary to produce that
wealth, and reduces income by decreases in wealth. Id.  Personal consumption,
albeit a reduction in wealth, was added back so as to remain in the tax base since
personal expenditures are not necessary or appropriate in the creation of wealth. Id.
I.R.C. § 262 codifies the principal of adding back personal consumption by
disallowing deductions for expenditures for personal consumption.  I.R.C. § 262.
42. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
43. See id.
44. See I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(3), 105, 106.
45. See infra Part II.E.
46. See supra note 41. R
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B. Employees with Employer-Provided Coverage
Contributions by an employer to an accident and health
plan for the benefit of an employee, his spouse, and his de-
pendents, including the payment of premiums, are
specifically excluded from income.47  Such contributions are
deductible by the employer as an ordinary and necessary bus-
iness expense.48  Amounts received by an employee through
health insurance provided by his employer for personal inju-
ries or sickness are also expressly excluded from income if
such amounts are paid, directly or indirectly, to the taxpayer
to reimburse the taxpayer for expenses incurred by him for
the medical care of the employee, his spouse, and his depen-
dents.49  The resultant benefit to an employee is the ability to
use pre-tax dollars to finance the purchase of health insur-
ance and to receive those benefits tax-free.
C. Self-Employed Persons
Premiums paid by a self-employed person for health insur-
ance for himself, spouse and dependents are deductible from
the business income of the self-employed person as a business
expense.50  Self-employed persons exclude medical benefits
received from health insurance in much the same way em-
ployees exclude payments from insurance.51  The effect for
the self-employed person is the same as the employed person
with employer-provided coverage, i.e., the ability to use pre-
tax dollars to fund the purchase of the health benefits and to
receive the medical benefits tax-free.
D. Employees without Employer-Provided Coverage but
with Access to a Cafeteria Plan
Employees whose employer does not contribute toward a
health plan or whose employer does not fully cover the cost of
47. I.R.C. § 106.
48. I.R.C. § 162(a).
49. I.R.C. § 105.
50. I.R.C. § 162(l).  Prior to 2003, a self-employed person could deduct only a
portion of health insurance premiums paid to insure himself, his spouse, and
dependents. Id.  The balance was deductible as an itemized deduction below-the-line
under I.R.C. § 213. Id. See infra discussion of I.R.C. § 213 at Part II.E.
51. I.R.C. § 104(a)(3).
\\server05\productn\R\RPP\2-1\RPP104.txt unknown Seq: 9 15-JUN-10 9:45
No. 1] Healing Healthcare 71
the insurance for the employee and his family can choose to
divert pre-tax compensation to the payment of premiums not
paid by the employer—if the employer sponsors a so-called
“Cafeteria Plan.”52  The employee may contribute pre-tax dol-
lars to the Plan and then select to purchase health insurance
from the “menu” of benefits.53  Benefits paid to the employee
from the health insurance arrangement are fully excluda-
ble—the same as for self-employed persons.54  The effect for
these taxpayers is again the ability to buy health insurance
with pre-tax dollars and to receive the incumbent benefits
tax-free.  The distinction between the employee using a Cafe-
teria Plan and the employee with employer provided health
insurance is that the employee using the Cafeteria Plan must
reduce the compensation he “takes home” in order to contrib-
ute to the Cafeteria Plan, much the way the self-employed
taxpayer reduces his “take-home” compensation by his health
insurance expenditures.  Nevertheless, the purchasing power
for these taxpayers is greater than the taxpayer who must
use after-tax dollars.
E. Employees without Employer-Provided Coverage and
without Access to a Cafeteria Plan
Employees who are not provided health insurance benefits
through their employment must purchase that insurance, if
they seek coverage, using income which has been included in
gross income for tax purposes.  The employee may deduct his
premiums as a part of the itemized deductions allowed for
non-reimbursed medical expenses.55  A taxpayer may deduct
as an itemized deduction medical expenses, the definition of
which includes the payment of health insurance premiums56
that exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income
(AGI).57  Because the medical expense deduction is subject to
a floor, the taxpayer loses the benefit of the first 7.5% of his
medical expenses.  Taxpayers are permitted to choose be-
52. I.R.C. § 125.
53. Id.
54. I.R.C. § 104(a)(3).
55. I.R.C. § 213(a).
56. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(C).
57. I.R.C. § 213(a).
\\server05\productn\R\RPP\2-1\RPP104.txt unknown Seq: 10 15-JUN-10 9:45
72 Regent Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 2
tween the standard deduction and itemized deductions.58  All
taxpayers are granted the standard deduction.  A taxpayer
will itemize only where his itemized deductions exceed the
standard deduction.59  In addition to medical expenses, item-
ized deductions include, among other deductions, mortgage
interest,60 charitable contributions,61 and state and local
taxes.62  Since all taxpayers are granted the standard deduc-
tion (including those who have excluded employer-provided
health benefits), the effect upon a taxpayer who has greater
itemized deductions is essentially that he benefits only to the
extent of the excess over the standard deduction.  The Inter-
nal Revenue Service reports that nearly two out of three
taxpayers take the standard deduction rather than itemizing
deductions.63  For those who purchase their health insurance
with after-tax dollars, the ability to deduct, at best, a portion
of those costs does not equate to the unlimited exclusion en-
joyed by the taxpayer who receives his benefits from his
employment.
F. Impact of the Statutory Scheme
An illustration of the impact of the statutory scheme in the
case of each type of financing of health insurance may serve
helpful.  I shall posit a simple example:  a married taxpayer
with two dependent children earns $50,000 in the taxable
year.  For purposes of this example, the author shall presume
the annual cost to provide health insurance for his family of
58. I.R.C. § 63.
59. For tax year 2009, the standard deduction for married taxpayers filing a
joint return is $11,400, $5,700 for singles and married individuals filing separately,
and $8,350 for heads of household.  IRS.gov, 2009 Inflation Adjustments Widen Tax
Brackets and Expand Tax Benefits, IRS NEWSWIRE, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=187825,00.html.  For tax year 2010, the standard deduction
for married taxpayers filing a joint return remained unchanged at $11,400; single
filers also was unchanged at $5,700 and head of household increased slightly to
$8,400.  IRS.gov, Inflation Having Little Effect on Tax Rates and Benefits in 2010,
IRS NEWSWIRE, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom.article/0,,id=214320,,00.
html.
60. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
61. I.R.C. § 170(a).
62. I.R.C. § 164(a).
63. Inflation Adjustments, supra note 59. R
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four is $13,375.64  Each of the four ways of financing health
insurance discussed above shall be quantified using these
facts to illustrate the profound economic differences which re-
sult from the current inequitable statutory scheme.  In each
case, the taxpayer will be entitled to four exemptions (two
personal exemptions and two dependency exemptions); the
amount of each exemption in 2009 was $3,650.65
First, in the case where the employer bears that cost, the
employee recognizes no further income because of the statu-
tory exclusion even though his economic compensation is
$13,375 greater.  Second, in the case where the taxpayer is
self-employed, his annual profits of $50,000 are reduced by
the expense he must bear to purchase the health insurance.
Since that expense is deductible, his taxable income is re-
duced by the $13,375.  Third, in the case where the employee
participates in a Cafeteria Plan and contributes $13,375 to
cover his insurance, his taxable wages are also reduced by
that amount.
Presume that each of these three taxpayers has no item-
ized deductions.  All three of these taxpayers are eligible for
the standard deduction ($11,400 in 2009),66 which each will
receive to arrive at adjusted gross income despite the fact
that the cost of health insurance has already either been ex-
cluded from income or deducted from income above the line.
This equates to a double benefit when contrasted against the
fourth employee who buys his own insurance with after-tax
dollars and is limited to an itemized deduction which he must
take in lieu of the standard deduction, if at all.
The taxpayer who must use after-tax dollars to purchase
his health insurance must reduce his wealth by the premium
expense of $13,375, but his only option is to deduct the premi-
ums as an itemized deduction below the line, that is, after
arriving at adjusted gross income.  Presume for simplicity
that his AGI is the same as his W-2 wages of $50,000.  To
make a consistent comparison, presume further that he has
64. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, SURVEY OF EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFITS (Sept.
15, 2009), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/7981.pdf.
65. I.R.S., REV. PROC. 2008-66 .19(1), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-08-66.
pdf (setting 2009 inflation adjustments for 26 C.F.R. 601.602(a) (2009)).
66. Id. at 11 (stating the standard deduction for married individuals filing joint
returns and surviving spouses).
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no other medical expenses.  His deduction will be limited by
the floor to the excess over 7.5% of AGI (7.5% of $50,000 =
$3,750.)  Therefore, the deduction will be limited to $9,625
($13,375 - $3,750).  The standard deduction for married tax-
payers filing a joint return in 2009 is $11,400.67  Because the
standard deduction exceeds the amount of the itemized de-
duction for medical expenses, the taxpayer enjoys no tax
subsidy for the financing of his healthcare.
The contrast becomes more stark when comparing the rela-
tive tax brackets of the four categories of taxpayers in this
simple example.  The marginal tax bracket of the taxpayer
whose employer pays his health insurance premium is 15%.
Therefore, the benefit to him of the tax savings he enjoys is
15% of the excluded amount ($13,375 x 15%= $2,006).  The
two categories of taxpayers who must reduce their economic
income by the premiums they pay, but who also enjoy either a
deduction or an exclusion for that expenditure, reduce their
taxable income to the extent that both of these taxpayers fall
into the lowest tax bracket of 10%, resulting in additional
savings.  The marginal tax rate of the last category of tax-
payer, paying for his own premiums and enjoying no subsidy,
is 15%.  He suffers the economic reduction of paying his own
premiums, and because he enjoys no deduction for that ex-
penditure, he must use not only after-tax dollars, but after-
tax dollars taxed at a higher rate.  The four categories of tax-
payers and the consequent economic results borne by the
statutory scheme are illustrated in the chart below.
III. REASONS FOR REFORM
A. Tax Expenditures
Most of us think the purpose of taxation, in general, and
the Internal Revenue Code, in particular, is raising revenue.
Indeed, the United States system of federal income taxation
does raise revenue to fund the federal government.68  But the
67. Id.
68. See FEDERAL RECEIPTS AND COLLECTIONS, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL RECEIPTS,
tbl.17-1. RECEIPTS BY SOURCE—SUMMARY 241, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2010/assets/receipts.pdf.  The Office of Management and Budget reports
actual receipts from Individual Income taxes for 2008 to be $1.1457 trillion and
projects receipts for 2009 as $953 billion. Id.
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Health Self- Cafeteria Health
Insurance Employed Plan Insurance
Compensation $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Employer-Provided +13,375 +0 +0 +0
Health Insurance
Economic Income $63,375 $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Exclusion <13,375> <0> <13,375> <0>
Gross Income $50,000 $50,000 $36,325 $50,000
Above the Line <0> <13,375> <0> <0>
Deduction
Adjusted Gross Income $50,000 $36,625 $36,625 $50,000
(AGI)
Standard Deduction <11,400> <11,400> <11,400> <11,400>
$38,600 $25,225 $25,225 $38,600
Exemptions <14,600> <14,600> <14,600> <14,600>
Taxable Income $24,000 $10,625 $10,625 $24,000
Tax $2,769 $1,063 $1,063 $2,769
Internal Revenue Code is also a mechanism for federal spend-
ing.  As we have seen, the federal tax law is premised on
normative concepts of income.69  Those concepts provide the
basic structure of the income tax system but do not provide
details regarding unit of taxation, rate of taxation, exclusions
from taxation, and the like.  Taking the unit of taxation as an
example, the basic normative structure does not establish
whether the unit of taxation should be an individual, a mar-
ried couple, a family, or an entity.  Those choices must be
made not as a matter of tax theory or tax policy but as a mat-
ter of broader social policy.  Those determinations must be
made by reference to social norms and goals.  A society which
wishes to encourage marriage for example, might create
69. See supra Part II.A. See also Comm’r. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,
429–31 (1955).
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favorable tax structures for the married couple.  In fact, the
Code provides many instances where a husband and wife are
treated as a single economic unit;70 for example, married tax-
payers may file as a single unit of taxation using the “married
filing jointly” status.71  From the inception of the income tax,
social policy choices have informed the development of the
statutory provisions.72  As such, the normative structure has
broadened to form the structural provisions necessary to real-
ize the revenue-raising aspects of the system of taxation.  But
the income tax is comprised of a second element, containing
all of the special preferences found in the Code which provide
an incentive or subsidy for certain behaviors; those incentives
and subsidies fall outside of the normative structure.73  In-
centives and subsidies operate to reduce tax liability, thus
conferring a monetary benefit upon the taxpayer engaging in
the favored behavior.  That monetary benefit represents fore-
gone revenue by the government.  The loss of revenue to the
Federal Treasury attributable to such preferences is appro-
priately viewed, from an economic perspective, as a type of
expenditure. Such an expenditure has become known as a
“tax expenditure.”74  Congress formally adopted the tracking
of tax expenditures75 in 1974.76  The term “tax expenditures”
is defined by statute as:
70. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 1041.
71. See I.R.C. § 1(a).
72. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Reform, federal, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TAXATION & TAX POLICY 392 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999).
73. See generally Emil M. Sunley & Janet Stotsky, Income Tax, federal, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY, supra note 72, at 179–80. R
74. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1–2 (1985).
Stanley Surrey served as Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury for Tax Policy
during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Id. at 309.  During his tenure he
proposed that the Congressional Budget Office compile a list of “tax expenditures” to
highlight the spending aspects of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 1–2.
75. Tax expenditures represent significant spending, sometimes in greater
amounts than that provided as a budgetary expenditure.  For example, the Tax
Policy Center reports that the tax expenditures for home ownership exceed total
spending by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 2008.  Tax
Expenditures:  What are the largest tax expenditures?  Tax Policy Briefing Book,
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/largest.cfm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2009).
76. Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3); 2 U.S.C.
§§ 601–612 (1974).
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those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the
Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemp-
tion, or deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of
tax liability; and the term “tax expenditures budget”
means an enumeration of such tax expenditures.77
Statutory exclusions from income for employer-provided
health benefits fall into the “special exclusions” definition of a
tax expenditure.  The exclusion is seen as “special” since it
does not comport with the normative structure of the income
tax system to tax all accessions to wealth.  As such, the cost of
this preference is reported as a part of the federal budget.78
The exclusion from income of employer contributions for
medical insurance premiums and medical care represents the
largest tax expenditure in the entire budget at a projected
cost to the U.S. Treasury of $142 billion for 2009.79  The cost
of the deductibility of medical expenses is projected as $9.66
billion for 2009,80 and for self-employed medical insurance
premiums the projection is $5.47 billion.81 The significance of
the exclusion of employer contributions for medical expenses
is more striking82 when ranked against other tax expendi-
tures.  For 2009, the next largest tax expenditure, the net
exclusion of all pension contributions and earnings in the ag-
gregate is projected at $122.35 billion.83  The third largest (or
the second largest single category), the deductibility of mort-
gage interest on owner-occupied homes, drops off
considerably from there at $97.28 billion.84  The sheer size of
77. See 2 U.S.C. § 622(3).
78. ESTIMATE OF FEDERAL RECEIPTS, tbl.19-1, supra note 68. R
79. Estimates of total income tax expenditures by category are compiled as a
part of the Analytical Perspectives of the Budget. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 301, 126 tbl.19-1 (2009).
80. Id. at 129 tbl.19-1.
81. Id. at 127 tbl.19-1.
82. Id. at 302 n.5.  In addition to the exclusion from income tax, employer-paid
health insurance premiums are also excluded from payroll taxes. Id.  The Office of
Management and Budget projects the effect on payroll tax receipts in 2009 to be
$86,490 million. Id.
83. Id. at 301, 141–45 tbl.19-1.  All categories of employee retirement
contributions have been aggregated to arrive at the total amount projected. Id.  The
Office of Management and Budget separately accounts for these tax expenditures by
the type of retirement plan. Id.
84. Id. at 300, 58 tbl.19-1.
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these tax expenditures begs for an analysis of the economic
impact of these subsidies on the supply and demand of medi-
cal services and products.
B. Fairness
A review of the mechanics of the basic statutory provisions
respecting the tax treatment of healthcare expenditures
yields striking disparities in the treatment of similarly situ-
ated taxpayers.  As we have seen from a simple example, a
taxpayer earning $50,000 per year will experience a very dif-
ferent economic consequence resulting from the taxation of
the type of healthcare coverage from which he benefits.85
Such a consequence violates principles of fairness, specifi-
cally violating the notion of tax justice known as “horizontal
equity.”  Horizontal equity postulates that taxpayers who
have the same amount of income should pay the same
amount of tax.86  The differences are noteworthy when ana-
lyzing a simple example with a taxpayer in the lowest tax
bracket,87 but a more nuanced analysis highlights striking
distortions when taxpayers of different brackets are
compared.
Our system of income taxation has adopted progressive
rates of taxation as a normative part of the structure of the
system.  The progressively higher rates of tax imposed upon
taxpayers with progressively higher incomes is based upon
the principle of tax justice known as “ability-to-pay”—the
greater the ability to pay, the greater the burden of payment.
A taxpayer in a higher bracket pays a higher rate of tax on
his last dollar of income.  That rate is known as his marginal
rate of tax.  The rate of tax which would be paid on one addi-
tional dollar of income also indicates the value of a deduction
or exclusion to that same taxpayer.  Avoiding paying tax on
that incremental dollar of income by excluding or deducting it
means avoiding paying tax at the percentage of his marginal
rate of tax.  For example, a taxpayer in the highest bracket
receiving health insurance benefits worth $13,375 saves the
85. See discussion supra Part II.F.
86. See Joseph J. Cordes, Horizontal Equity, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION
& TAX POLICY, supra note 72, at 164–66. R
87. See discussion supra Part II.F.
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tax on that income at that highest rate.  At a current rate of
35%, the higher income, higher bracket employee saves
$4,681.  Contrast that with a taxpayer in the lowest bracket
who saves by the exclusion only $1,337 on the same amount
of income.  The exclusion appears to benefit the wealthier
taxpayer.  Many health economists argue that tax subsidies
for employer-provided healthcare benefits are regressive:
Workers in a higher bracket benefit more than those in lower
brackets.88  But others disagree citing the benefit in percent-
age terms rather than absolute dollar amounts.89  Viewed as
a percentage of income, the tax subsidy appears progressive
since lower income taxpayers benefit more as a percentage of
income than do higher income taxpayers.90
Distributional effects of the tax subsidies must also be eval-
uated and examined for fairness.  Data evaluating the federal
tax subsidies for health benefits by income stratum show
higher earners benefiting more as a group because a greater
proportion of employees in the group enjoy employer-paid
coverage.  For employees earning less than $10,000 annually,
only 10% of employees were provided employer-paid cover-
age; contrast that with employees earning $50,000–$75,000
annually where more than half of employees are covered.
And for those with incomes over $100,000 annually, 61% ben-
efited from employer-provided health coverage.91
A fair system of taxation must also be transparent.  The tax
consequences of the various tax subsidies and incentives are
difficult for taxpayers to evaluate and understand.  The effect
of the tax expenditures for healthcare on tax incidence92 is
especially murky.  A fair system of taxation identifies the cost
88. See CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., PROGRESSIVE OR REGRESSIVE? A SECOND LOOK AT
THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS, THE





90. See David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of
Taxing Employer-Paid Health Insurance, NEW ENG. J. OF MED. (Aug. 19, 2009),
available at http://healthcarereform.nejm.org/?p=152.
91. Id.
92. DODGE, supra note 41, at 120–21.  Tax incidence describes the economic R
proposition of determining the ultimate distribution of the burden of paying a tax.
Id.
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of those expenditures and evaluates who bears those costs.
An economic analysis reveals that the subsidies increase
costs and depress wages.  The incidence of the tax subsidy
therefore is borne, at least in part, by workers.
C. Impact of Tax Policy on Healthcare
The historical examination seems to indicate that tax sub-
sidies encouraged employers to provide health insurance
coverage.  Social insurance in the form of health benefits and
financial benefits for the sick stabilize the society and provide
personal security, worthy goals indeed.  However, escalating
healthcare costs threaten the economic viability of the sys-
tem.  The current subsidy distorts the healthcare market by
encouraging employees to have more coverage than they oth-
erwise would.  Because the subsidy lowers the cost of
insurance, any given employee naturally prefers additional
compensation in the form of health insurance rather than
wages.  The resultant over-subscription to healthcare drives
up costs.  The subsidy artificially inflates demand and pro-
motes economic inefficiency by fostering over-utilization of
health services.
Health insurance is not a typical commodity in the market-
place.  An historical review93 reveals that employer-provided
health insurance arose as a way to provide security from a
type of uncertainty—that is the risk of lost wages and the
costs of medical care should the family provider become ill.
Previously, workers without the capacity to save for ex-
traordinary risks relied on charity.  That uncertainty caused
individual insecurity as well as social and economic instabil-
ity.  The purpose of health insurance, indeed all types of
insurance, is to pool resources and share risks in order to al-
leviate uncertainty.  Health insurance differs somewhat from
other forms of insurance because the risk of, and therefore
the demand for, medical care depends upon the state of
health of individual participants.  The difficulty in predicting
individual health needs makes it harder to quantify risk.94
93. See discussion supra Part I.
94. See Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the
Medical Economy, 24 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 629, 630 (June 1986).
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The tax provisions operate to favor employer-provided
health insurance over other types of pooling arrangements.
That incentive shifts control over healthcare choices from em-
ployees to employers and the insurance companies with
which they bargain.  The lack of choice reduces purchasing
options and prevents the patient from seeking lower-cost,
higher quality alternatives.  The resultant lack of competi-
tion also contributes to increasing costs.95
The tax subsidy operates to artificially drive down wages.
Because employers do not pay social security tax on health-
care benefits, those benefits offer a cheaper form of
compensation than cash wages.  Employees comparing wages
do not always comprehend the value of fringe benefits they
receive.  Employees often view the benefits as “free.” Obvi-
ously, employer-based health insurance is not a free benefit.
Because health insurance benefits substitute for wages, em-
ployees ultimately share the burden of high health care costs
in the form of lower wages.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
The historical review of the development of employer-pro-
vided health insurance and the tax provisions which
subsidize that system, provide a helpful starting point for de-
signing a framework for reform.  The high cost, economic
inefficiency, and basic unfairness of the current system of tax
expenditures seem to be reason enough to reform the current
tax provisions respecting the taxation of healthcare.  But
more precisely, the question for reform is what role the fed-
eral tax system should play in promoting healthcare benefits,
and if it is to be a tool to do so, what structure best meets that
goal.  We have learned that the current scheme operates as a
subsidy, mostly for those who receive healthcare benefits
from their employer.  The options available to reformers
range from complete repeal of all tax subsidies96 to a new
95. See Michael Cannon, Combining Tax Reform and Health Care Reform with
Large HSAs, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. NO. 23, May 2005.
96. See Richard A. Epstein, The Taxation of Employee Health Care Benefits,
Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/16/taxation-employee-benefits-
opinions-columnists-healthcare.html.
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type of tax designed to fund a voucher system to provide uni-
versal healthcare to all.97
Based on the analysis above, any reform proposal should
meet the following criteria:
A. Encourage Risk-Sharing.
Based on the historical development of pooling resources to
reduce risk, any plan should promote risk-sharing through
appropriate levels of insurance.  Appropriate levels are criti-
cal as the United States has seen that over-insurance by
some increases demand and drives up prices.  Tax advan-
tages should favor only those plans which promote pooling for
those risks which are truly catastrophic and for which the
taxpayer cannot otherwise protect against by saving.
B. Encourage Saving
The current system of a mix of no savings and some savings
along with over-insurance does not operate to stabilize prices
or incent positive consumer behavior.  Where insurance is
used only to provide for catastrophic need, consumers should
be encouraged to save to pay out-of-pocket for normal medical
expenses.  Because a consumer will bear the cost directly, he
will make more economically efficient choices.
C. Extend Tax Benefits to All
Any structure or structures employed must result in all
taxpayers being treated the same.  If the purchase of high-
deductible catastrophic coverage is the goal, the tax system
may subsidize that purchase but only under a scheme where
all taxpayers enjoy the benefit of the purchase using pre-tax
dollars.
D. Eliminate Bias Toward Employer-Provided Coverage
Where all taxpayers enjoy the benefit of using pre-tax dol-
lars to purchase insurance, the bias toward employer-
provided insurance and collective purchasing through em-
97. See Leonard E. Burman, A Blueprint for Tax Reform and Health Reform, 28
VA. TAX REV. 287, 300–01 (2009).
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ployment should diminish.  This should promote greater
competition, reduce price, and provide portability.
E. Encourage Healthy Habits
Americans are making poor health choices.  Any reform
should evaluate ways to incent individual healthy choices.
F. Encourage Healthy Business Enterprise
Any reform should include reforms to eliminate perverse
subsidies to agri-business and energy sectors which cause
health hazards by their business practices.
G. Provide Transparency
New structures should be clear and compliance should be
simple.
CONCLUSION
Given that the current system of delivering healthcare is
unsustainable, present circumstances present an opportune
time to reform perverse tax subsidies.  The proposed frame-
work suggests, among other options, a number of solutions:
(1) Pre-tax benefits should be limited to expenditures for pro-
tection against catastrophic risks; (2) health savings accounts
(HSAs), that is, tax-free savings of pre-tax dollars, can pro-
vide financial security by funding out-of-pocket costs; (3) a
consumption tax, such as a Value Added Tax, might in con-
cert with a HSA operate to encourage saving rather than
spending; (4) an above-the-line deduction for health insur-
ance premiums to purchase high-deductible catastrophic
coverage is one way to level the playing field and increase
options, competitive pricing, and portability by eliminating
the bias toward employer-provided plans; and (5) eliminating
certain subsidies for agri-business and energy sectors could
promote healthier food production and contribute toward
greater energy efficiencies.  A new system which encourages
well-being, social security, and economic stability is a compel-
ling rationale for significant tax reform.
Our health depends upon it.
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